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There is a large body of literature analyzing share tenancy. This
literature is concerned with the efficiency of production and the dis-
tribution of returns which occurs under the assumption of a landlord
class which rents-out its land to a landless tenant class on a output
1/ share arrangement.— ‘l%is,of course, corresponds to conditions which
exist in large, irrigated areas of Asia.
But, share tenancy is only a special case of a general category of
2/ usufruct relations.— The usufruct relation analyzed in this paper is
the rental of land owned by small farmers to large farm operators on
an output sharing contract arrangement; it is in certain regards the
polar case of share tenancy. Although perhaps not
“tenancy” case, examples of land “rental”
especially in dryland areas of the Middle
case are
East and
as common as the
also widely found,
3/ North Africa.–
Research Specialist and Associate Professor, respectively, Department
of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota.
See in particular &oo /–9_lwhich usefully summar_iz~sthe d&bateA
Also, see Cheung/_4_~B~rdhan and Srinivasan/_ 3_/, Sen~ 15_/
and Georgesen-Roegen~ 6_/, in that order. There are, of course,
many other contributions to this literature.
Usufruct is defined as the right to use of a property without the
right to ownership.
Warriner, for instance, discusses the emergence of a land rental market
in the Jezira region of northern Syria in response to changes in
technology (the introduction of capital-intensive cerea&s production)
that are similar to the Tunisian case. See Warriner, ~ 16, pp. 55-l12_~.-2-
Indeed, it was the frequent observation of rental relationships during the
fieldwork conducted by Fraenkel in northern Tunisia in 1972-73 that motivated
the present paper. These observations provide the empirical support for
the propositions suggested.
We address ourselves to the following questions:
1. Under what conditions does the case of land rental, as distinct
from land tenacy,occur?
2. What are the welfare implications of the rental case for the
small and large farmer class?
These questions are posed in the context of a “dualistic” agriculture. The
impacts of three separate but related elements of this environment will
be analyzed. The first relates to the distinction between a modern and
traditional technology. The second relates to the indispensability and
indivisibility of production inputs. The last relates to the impact
of different market structures on the rental of land and the distribution
of land operation between small and large farmers.
The theory presented below has implications for a general theory
of institutional development. It is proposed that new institutional arrange-
ments for transferring usufruct of production resources from one operator
to another emerge in response to changes in demand and supply conditions
related to the potential of maximizing returns from the diffusion of an
improved technology within the constraints imposed by existing instittitional-3-
4/
structures.— In our case, a private land rental market transferring oper-
ational control of land from small to large farmers evolved as a mechanism
for increasing the spread of adoption of the high yielding cereals technology
within the restraints on direct small farmer adoption imposed by the imperfect
resource market structures of
In section I, a model of
presents the explicit choices
5/ a dualistic agricultural sector.—
agricultural production is put forward. It
of rental or owner-operation of resources.
This is followed in section II by consideration of the small and large farmer
maximization problems under the restraints imposed by a dualistic agriculture.
In the remaining sections the model is used as a means of formulating
hypotheses about the land rental market, and
Tunisian cereal farming is used to exemplify
evidence from a case study of
and validate the hypotheses.
&/ See Davis and North ~–5_~ for the development of a general model of
institutional change. They propose a distinction parallel to ours
between “institutional arrangements” and “institutional structures.”
An institutional arrangement, such as the land rental market discussed
here, provides its members with some added income that they would
otherwise forego. An institutional structure, on the other hand,
consists of the “set of fundamental political, social, and legal_
gr~undrules,” in our situation, those of a “dualistic” society~p. 6-
7_/. Concerning the relation of institutions to t~ch~ical change in
agriculture, specifically, see Hayami and Ruttan ~ 7_/, and note the
,following as related to our model: “The modernization of land tenure
relationships, involving a shift from share tenure to lease tenure
and owner-operator systems of cultivation in much of western agriculture,
can be explained in part, as a shift in property rights designed to
internalize the gains of entre reneurial innovation by individual
farmers.” 7 Ruttan~ 13, p.20_ .
5_/ For a pessimistic discussion of the possibilities of “small farmer
development,” (assumed to be the direct adoption by small farmers of
new technologies) within the structures of dualistic& or “bimo~al”
societies, see Dale W. Adams and E. Walter Coward, ~ 1, p. 22_/. Our
argument is twofold: (1) in the presence of new technological potential,
these restraintsmay deter the diffusion of technology less than is
usually supposed because of new institutional arrangements; (2) even
the welfare implications may be less adverse than pessimists fear.
.-4-
1. A Model of Agricultural Land Use and Production
The model presented in this section focuses on the distribution of
control of land for cereals production between the small (traditional) and
large (modern) farmer classes. It is assumed that the model is closed
with the stock of land, labor and capital in fixed supply, but that labor,
capital services, and land flow between the two sectors. Production
functions are assumed to be neoclassical in four variables; land, labor,
capital and variable inputs. Restraints are placed on the model which
leads to a distinction between the maximization problems for the large and
small farmer classes. Each class is assumed to maximize investable surplus.
Based on these maximizations and assumptions about the market structure for
capital services, land rental relations and terms are determined.
In general, in a bimodel agriculture, the possible land tenancy





where (All, A22) represent land owned and operated by the tradition and
modern sector and (A12 A ) is owned by the traditional (modern) sector , 21
6/ and operated by the modern (traditional) sector.— Thus, A presents the
distribution of the ownership and operation of land in the agricultural
sector. For simplicity, (and,in fact,realism), the total land (H) is
assumed fixed for the sector, i.e.,
~/ In terms of notation the first index refers to ownership while the
second refers to tenancy. The index 1 is used for the traditional
and 2 for the modern sector.1
I -5-
‘e ‘ermA21 corresponds to the more
of land from the large land owning to
‘em ’12 is in this respect the polar
the large farmer.
usual discussion of tenancy, the rental
7/ the small cultivating class.— The
case where the small farmer rents to
Since the preponderance of literature has concentrated on the efficiency
and tenancy arrangements of Aol and since the phenomenon observed in northern
LJ.
‘Unisia ‘as ’12’ the emphasis of the
‘ramework ‘or ’12” h ‘etermined ‘n
1
under these conditions (see P.13).
Corresponding to A is an output
model is on developing an explanatory





where X.. is output from ith owned land operated by jth group.
lj!
Each componentof output is produced by a neoclassical production
function of four generalized inputs:
(4) Xij = ‘ij(Lij’ ‘ij’ %cij’ ‘ij)
where L.. is labor used on ij land and %ij is kth owned capital used on
lJ
ij land and S. is variable inputs (seed, fertilizer, herbicide and so
Ji
~/ The difference between this arrangement (A21) and the usual discussion
of land tenancy is that the small farmer group may own as well as rent
in land. This is important in terms ~f ~efining the choices open to
small farmers. For instance Cheung ~ 4_/ assumes that the tenant is
landless and owns only a labor resource.-6-
forth) of j used on the land rented from i. Each of these inputs is assumed
to be indispensable for production, i.e.,
(Al) Xij >0 iff(Lij, A SO)>() ~\ij$ Ji
ij ‘
Further from the neoclassical assumptions
(A.2) Fijn >0 n = 1, ... 4
(A.3) Fijnn < 0
8/ n=l, .,. 4—




where H and N are constant.
Real investable surplus (ni) in food equivalent for each sector is
equal to gross output on owned and rented land minus input costs plus
(minus) the rental payment minus household consumption expenses.z’
(6) ni = Xii + rXij + (l-r)Xji - Ma
2 2 2
- pz +pEKk -PES




~f F.. refers to the nth partial derivative of F and F.. refers
t&J%e nth second order partial i.e., F is ~~e marg~~~~ productivity
‘~~ marginal productivity.
‘f land and ‘ij22
is the rate of change
~/ Since the purpose of the present model is an analysis of resource
transfer, no account is taken of wage payments. Implicitly this assumes
that all labor is household labor and that payment is in terms of
consumption allowance.-7-
11. RestraintsOf Dual Agricultural Sector
Until this point, the farmer classes have been treated in an entirely
symmetric fashion. However, because of institutional factors characteristic
of a dualistic agricultural sector, certain restraints must be introduced.
In the context of the model, these amount to restricting the possible
alternatives to acquiring resources for production.
The most obvious restraint is the indivisibility of the indispensable
capital input. The implication of this capital indivisibility is that
the traditional sector must purchase capital services from the modern sector.
Indeed, this dependence is a primary defining characteristic of the small
farmer class. Thus:





the ownership of capital of the Ith sector and c is the credit
other words, because of a credit and ownership restraint, all
capital is owned by the modern sector.
A second type of restraint relates to the variable inputs. In many
developing economies, small farmers are unable to obtain modern inputs
because of credit restraints or other exclusionary practices. Adoption
of modern technology depends on greater use of purchased inputs than the-a-
traditional technology.~’ These institutional restraints may have the effect
of restricting the small farmer to the
even where he has the capacity to self
technology.”’ Thus:
(R.3) c ; S ~kl=o
use of the traditional technology
finance adoption of the modern
A. Small Farmer Maximization
In addition to the general restraints imposed above, other factors
characteristic of a dualistic agriculture effect the range of choice of the
small farmer. First, there is the economic viability of the farm unit in
terms of its income generating capacity. Second, there are alternative
market structures for resources and land rental. The income of the small
farm determines its ability to generate an investable surplus, while the
land rental and resource markets determine the returns to the alternatives
of direct operation or rental.
10/ — The traditional technology is considered to consist of the following:
(1) two disc cultivations by tractor, (2) hand broadcasting of un-
selected seed, and (3) machine harvesting. The modern technology is
as follows: (1) 1 deep plowing and 3 superficial, disc cultivations
by tractor, (2) drilling of selected seed, (3) 100kiloseach of
nitrogenous and phosphatic fertilizers, (4) weeding by hand or herbicide,
(5) machinery harvesting. One notes that the modern technology alone
includes yield-increasing,biological-chemicaltinputs. For further
information concerning the traditional and modern technologies, see
the partial budgets on page~+tu
11/ Thus, in the diffusion of innovation the land rental market plays analogous —
to a capital market. Both rental and credit are, of course, instances
of usufruct relations. For a discussion of the relation of capital
markets to technological change with_obvious implications for our
analysis, see Ronald I. McKinnon, ~ 11, p. 5-21_~.-9-
There are three possible situations which can face the small farmer
under the assumption of a dual technology. (1) Total income generated on
his property using traditional technology is less than that necessary for
continued operation and household subsistence,
and
‘12 ‘x21=0
where M is average family size, a* is minimum per capita subsistence
consumption, p is the price of custom capital services, K’211
is capital
services necessary for traditional technology.z’ Ps is the price of vari-
able inputs and S’ll is the minimum amount of inputs possible for
production.=’ If a farmer is in class (Cl) and has no additional income,
then he is forced to rent or, of course, to sell his land in order to get
a consumption advance on his share of the harvest. Although we are
analyzing explicitly only the rental decision, the decision to sell
follows where X,l 14/ < Ma* over a period of years.—
J-1.
(2) Total income from XII is greater
requirements and the investment needed for
than household consumption
operation using the traditional
12/ This is an assumption of minimum tillage needed for operation. —
13/ Sll refers to unselected seed under the traditional technology. —
14/ In fact, during the colonial period, sale by the small Tunisian land —
owner to the large French operator occurred automatically once the value
of the consumption advances taken by the farmer to meet Ma* exceeded
the value of the land. Definitive transfer of title under these con-
ditions has been institutionally restrained by the nationalist government,
apparently in the hope of preserving a small landowing -- if not
operating -- class.-1o-
technology but less than what is necessary to acquire resources for modern
technology, i.e.,
and
‘12 = ’21 ‘0”
where the superscript 2 on K and S implies levels necessary to achieve the
modern technology.
(3) Class (C.3) has the ability to achieve the modern technology, i.e.,






(C,2) and (C.3) have
= ’21 = o.
the alternative of renting out or direct operation.
These are the classes that determine the equilibrium price of rental
land.
Given the indispensability assumption made above (Al) and the
assumption that the small farmer sector must purchase capital inputs, the
structure of this market becomes a central determinant of decisions
regarding land control. Outcomes in three market structures are analyzed:
(1) purely competitive market in long-run equilibrium, (2) an oligopolistic
market involving price fixing above the competitive rate and (3) a collusive-11-





Arraying the three economic classes and the three market
capital services in Table 1, the decisions of six of the
immediately determined. Table 1 summarizes this result.
(C.1.3) are forced to rent because they cannot achieve a high
enough income to operate. Cases (2.3) and (3.3) are renters because they
cannot purchase custom capital services, an indispensable input. Case
(3.1) is an operator since he can obtain the entire advantage of the
increased yields of modern technology and has access to custom tractor
services on a minimum average cost basis. The outcome of cases (2.1),
(2.2) and (3.2) will depend on the rental terms (r), the prices of custom
services (p) and the advantage to be gained by utilizing the modern instead
of the traditional technology.
We will now turn to analyzing the outcome of an optimizing strategy
of the remaining small farmer cases (2.1), (2.2) and (3.2).
It is hypothesized that the small (traditional) farmer will attempt
to maximize his utility, a function of his profits and labor input, subject
to the possible alternatives he faces. Specifying this formally we have
to maximize
(7) U1 = Ul(ml, Lll)
where due to (R.1) - (R.3)-12-
Table 1
The Small Farmers Rental Decision and the Structure
of the Capital Custom Service Market
-------- Market Structures ----------
Oligopolistic
Small Farmer Price collusive
Income Class Competitive Fixing oligopoly
(Cl) xll <Ma* +pK’211+ (C.1.1) (C.1.2) (C.1.3)
Pss;~ Renter Renter Renter
(c.2) Ma* +pK’211+PsS~1 < ~1 (C.21) (C.202) (C.2.3)
< MS* + pss:l + PK;ll
? ? Renter
(c.3) xllzMa*+pSs~l+ (C.3.1) (c.3.2) (C.3.3)
PK:ll Operator ? Renter-13-
subject to:
(9) ~ _ -a*>O
a subsistence consumption constraint.
a production function constraint
(11) H - All - A12 - A22 z O
a land restraint and
(12) rF12 (L12 +2, K212, S21) -rX12~0
9
15/ a rental production function restraint.—
15/ The share tenancy possibility (A ) could be analyzed with only slight —
modification of the above. Equa&m (8) must be modified to allow rented
in as well as rented out land
(8’) ml = X11+ r~2+ (1-r)X21 -Ma - P(K211+K221) - ps(sll+ S12)
and one restraint for rented in land must be added:
(12’) (l-r) F21(L21, A21, K221, S12) - (l-r) X21Z0.
The Lagrangian function can then be reformed and the modified first
order necessary conditions derived:
(P.1’) U12/U11 = Fill= (1-r)F211
(P.2’) F112 = rF122 = (1-r)F212
(P.3’) F113= (1-r)F213= p
(P.4’) F114 = (1-r)F214 = PS
(P*5) ‘llM = 11
Notice, as distinct from what happens in the case analyzed in the text,
the marginal productivities of tenant land must also be higher than
owner-operated land. This is precluded from happening based on the dual
technology assumption. However, in labor intensive agriculture the
empirical counterpart of the land tenancy literature, this condition is-14-
By assuming efficient production-equalitieson (10) and (12),
substituting (8) into (7), the following Lagrangian function can be formed.
(7.1) A= U1(F1l(L1l, All, K211> Q + rF&2’ A12’ K212, S12)
-Ma- PK211 - PsSll~ Lll)
+ Al(a - a*) + A2(H - All - A12 - A22)
The decision variables for this problem are Lll, All, A12, K211, S1l, a.
For the small farmer r, the rental terms, F.., large farmer production
J-L
function M the family size, p and ps, the price of
)
minimum subsistence parameters are given.
) From the first order necessary conditions for
following can be derived:
inputs, and a*, the
maximization the
(P.2) F112 = rF122
(P.3) F113= P
(P.4) F114 = ps
(P.5) U1lM = Al
realized. An interesting point is that historically in northern Tunisia,
prior to the introduction of mechanization and the modern inputs, the
khammessat tenancy relation was widely found. (Khammessat refers to
the 20% share allocated to labor under traditional tenancy). Significantly,
on non-mechanizable land, tenancy relations still exist in northern
Tunisia. For a historical treatment of the colonial period in Tunisian
agriculture which stresses the interaction of changes in cereals production
technologies and land usufruct relations, see Ponce.t l_12_/, Part I.-15-
Condition (P.1) states that labor will be used until the value marginal
productivity in utility terms is equal to the marginal utility of labor.
Condition (P.2) states that the marginal productivity of alternative land
uses valued in terms of what the traditional sector receives must be equal,
that the marginal productivity of rented land must exceed the marginal
productivity of owner operated land., (P.3) and (P.4) are usual marginal
cost, marginal productivity conditions, i.e., utilize inputs until the
marginal revenue equals the marginal cost. Lastly (P.5) states the
implicit value for exceeding subsistence consumption (A2). It is a joint
productof the marginal utility of income (IT) and family size (M).
In terms
Assuming that
of the question of land rental (P.2) is a central result.
r, the rental share, is less than one, this condition implies
that the small farmer will choose to rent only if the rental operator can
achieve higher productivity than the owner operator. Although this iS
self-evident, it does provide an insight into the solution of the rental
problem. We can now see why case (3.1) is an operator. For him there
is by assumption no productivity advantage to be gained by renting. Case
(3.2)would be an operator if the competitive price for custom services
prevailed since he could directly adopt the modern technology. However,
since by assumption the price of custom services is higher than under the
competitive structure, some of the individuals in (3.2) will fall back
into the situation of (2.1). Cases (2.1) and (2.2) cannot achieve the
higher technology solutions as operators. Their decision will depend on
rental terms (r) and the difference in yields of the two technologies.
Obviously the larger the productivity gain and the higher the rental share,
the more likely is it that (2.1) and (2.2) will choose to be renters.-16-
As in case (3.1) and (3.2) because of the difference in custom service
price, (2.2) is more likely to rent than (2.1) since he can not only
benefit from higher productivity but also avoid paying the higher custom
service prices.
B. Large Farmer Maximization
The analysis has placed a lower bound on r. In no case will the small
farmer rent out his land unless his return from doing so at least equals
what he would make
explanation of the
land available for
by operating it himself. This provides us with an
supply function of rental land. As r increases the
rental goes from the forced-choice cases (1.1) -
(1.3), (2.3), and (3.3) -- to include all of the mechanizable land owned
by the small farmer class, since r approaching 1 provides income greater
than that gained from working the land directly. A further incentive
for the small farmer to rent, not taken into consideration in this model,
is the asymmetry of risks provided for by the usual share rental arrangement.
According to this arrangement, output is shared but all inputs costs are
paid by the larp~ farmer. As a result, large farmers may suffer losses
from adoption of the modern technology, but the small farmer cannot.
It is the large farmer maximization problem which can help us determine
the demand for rental land, the upper bound of r. Because of their access
to credit and capital equipment, large farmers can increase the productivity
of the small farmer holdings by utilizing the improved methods and still
161 compensate the small farmer.- Indeed, it is the productivity dividend
16/ This is to be contrasted with the welfare implications of mechanical —
innovations in the more frequently analyzed, and perhaps more commonly
found situation where landlords and ~abo~ers are mutually exclusive











which ptovides leverage for the rental arrangement in all but cases of
forced choice rental. At the lower end, as we have seen the rental payment
must at least equal what the small farmer could earn using traditional
technology. As an upper bound, the payment must equal the traditional
return plus the productivity advantage, leaving to the large farmer an
income exactly equal to his marginal costs. This is analyzed further
below.
It is assumed that the large farmer like the small farmer attempts
to maximize utility as a function of profits and labor. The difference is
due to the asymmetrical restraints. The large farmer has access to long-
and short-term credit, modern inputs and owns the indivisible capital
stock which he may utilize on his own land, rented land and to provide
custom services. This problem can be specified as the maximization of:
2
(13) u.= um(~o, ~ L..)
L L~ k
KL
where from (6) with (R.1) - (R.3)
2
(14) ~z=xzz+ (l-r)Xlz -Ma+ PK211 ‘ps~ski)
subject to:
(15) F22(L22, A22, K222’ S22) - X22 20
(16) (1-r)F12(L12,A12, K212, slz) - (l-r)xlz Lo
(17) K2T -Kzll -Kzlz -K222Z0
(18) H -All -Alz -A22Z0-18-
It is assumed that the consumption
decisions are made. Equation (17) is a
that the total flow of capital services
stock (K2) must be greater than the sum
level (a) is given when the firm
capital restraint which simply states
(K2T) possible from the capital
of capital uses. In the indivisible
capital assumption employed here there is presumably a simple conversion
factor between K2 and K2T such as
(19) K2T = YK2
where y gives the amount of land that can be serviced by a stock of capital
in a given time period. The remaining restraints have been presented above.
For the large farmer L22, L12, A12, A22, K211, K212, K222, S12, S22
are control variables, Whereas, H, All, P, Pa, r are viewed as parameters
(at least for the initial competitive solution). Substituting (14) into
(13) and assuming efficient production -- the equality of (15) and (16) --
the first order necessary conditions for maximization yield:
= -U22
(P.6) F221 = (1 -r)F121
’21
(P.7) F222 = (1 -r)F212
(P.8) F223 = (1 -r)F123=p
(P.9) F224 = (1 - r)F124 = ps
Conditions (P.6) through (P.9) all contain the rental payment (1 - r)
as a parameter. In each case the marginal productivity of the inputs on-19-
k
I
the rented land must be higher than on the owner-operated land. This can
be interpreted two ways. Under (A,l) and (A.2) either less inputs would be
used on rented land than owner-operated land or there is a productivity
advantage to rented in land under the same input-levels, i.e., productivity
gain from using new technology on previously traditionally-operatedland
could be very high. The central conclusion of this section is that the
demand for rented land is fundamentally related to the increases in productivity
that can be obtained by utilizing modern inputs on land that otherwise would
be operated with the traditional technology.
111. The Land Rental Market
As we have seen, the small farmer will rent in exchange for a share
of the gains of the high-yield technology where he does not have access
to modern inputs or credit because of insufficient investment surplus or
exclusion from resource markets. The large farmer is a demander of rented
land because he can use the high yield technology over a wider hectarage,
more fully utilize the capacity of his indivisible capital, and exploit his
access to credit.
We can now compute a supply and demand function for rental land.
Figure 1 represents such a market. The vertical axis represents r, the
percentage of output per hectare earned as rent by the small farmer
landowner. On the horizontal axis is the percentage of mechanizable land
owned by small farmers that is rented to large farmer operators. It is
assumed that this land is distributed among Classes I, 11, and
111 of the model.-20-
Figure 1:
Land Rental Market
r = % of output
I to Small Farmers
I
I




















I II III By Income Classes-21-
Several observations concerning the equilibrium value of r are in
order. Despite the existence of Class
rent, the value of r can never be less
technology (?TX1l). This is because of
I small farmers (who are forced to
than the return to the traditional
the existence of Class II farmers
who are capable of operating with the traditional technology and, as
marginal renters, permit the forced choice, Class I farmers to enjoy a
renters’ surplus. Moreover, since large farmers are willing to pay a
share based on the return to the modern technology (ITX ) r can be assumed 12 ‘
to be greater than the return to the traditional technology (mXII). However,
r is less than the full return to the modern technology, because the large
farmers will not rent unless they can cover something more than variable
costs.
It should also be noted that to bid away land owned by Class III small
farmers, large farmers would have to offer r approaching ‘iT~2,since Class
III farmers have the capacity to self-finance direct adoption of the modern
technology. We say ‘close’ to n1$2 because of the asymmetry of risks of
the rental arrangement under discussion (where output, but not input costs,
are shared).
Iv l Case Study of the Locality of Ebbs-Ksour
Fieldwork was conducted in 1972-73 on three plains situated near the
town of Ebbs-Ksour (gouvernorat of Kef).g’ Information collected during
fieldwork is presented to exemplify the model and to validate certain of
its hypotheses.
17/ For background information concerning agriculture_in ~he gouvernorat —
of Kef, see the excellent monograph by Makhlouf ~,10_/. The town
of Ebbs-Ksour is also known as Dahmani, Fieldwork was conducted on
the plains of Zouarines, Abida, and Lorbeus.-22-
Table 2 presents the official statistics for land use for the delegation
of Ebbs-Ksour. One notes the high percentages of cropland to total land area,
and of cereals to cropland. This indicates that the ‘extensivemargin’ at
which the expansion of the large, modern farms must take place is the
mechanizable land operated by small farmers with the traditional technology,
the assumption presented in equation (2) of the model; there is no additional
cropland potential.
Not all of the land used for cereals production in the locality is
cultivable by machinery; the hilly land around the plains can be worked only
with draft animals. Estimates of the hectarage by plain of mechanizable
land, the focus of our analysis, are presented in Table 3. Interestingly,
it is on the remaining, non-mechanizable land that one still finds tenancy
relations.
Sixty-five percent of total cereals hectarage in the locality is planted
to durum wheat. Most of this land is in biennial rotation with unworked
fallow or barley alternating
Official statistics for
the existence of a dualistic
distribution of land between
with durum.
the delegation of Ebbs-Ksour also document
agricultural structure, that is, a bimodal
large and small farmers. (see Table 4).
On the plains of Abida and Lorbeus, where all large farms could be
surveyed, we calculate that .28%of the land operated by the large farmers
is rented (see Table 5). This only partially indicates the significance of
the rental market in transferring land from small to large farmers. Much
of the land now owned by large farmers was rented in the past from small
farmers and subsequently purchased.-22a-
Table 2
Land Use in the Delegation of Ebbs-Ksour, in Hectares
Total Crop
land land Cereals
area area (2)/(l)xloo area (4)/( 2)X1OO
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
72,900 61,620 84.53 49,000 79.52
Source: L’Agriculture clansle governorat du Kef, unpublished
document, Tunisian Ministry of Agriculture, 1972.
Table 3




Source: Estimation made by Fraenkel based on field observation
and topographicalmaps.-23-
Table 4
Distribution of Land by Farm Size Class in the Delegation of
I$bba-Ksour ~/
Farm size Percent of Percent of
,cl. qs8 (in has) all farmers land
0-20 84.4 23.0
20 - 50 7.5 18.0
50 - 100 5.1 15.0
> 100 3.0 44.0
Source: L!Agriculture clansle gouvernorat du Kef, unpublished document,
Tunisian Ministry of Agriculture, 1972.
Table 5
Hectares of Land Operated by Large Farmers
Plain Has operated Has owned Has rented
Abida 6,134 5,283 851
Lorbeus 2,818 1,876 942
Source: Estimation made by Fraenkel.-24-
Partial budgets derived from survey data are presented to show the
differences in resource use and net returns between the traditional and modern
technologies (see Table 6). Farm survey data further indicate that almost
all of the small farmers in the locality use the traditional technology,
and that large farmers use the modern technology according to these partial
budgets. Large farmers own machinery, whereas small farmers operate by
purchasing custom machinery services. No small farmer used any chemical
fertilizers, while most the large farmers used them as budgeted. These data
suggest the pattern of market exclusion such as we are hypothesizing, rather
than a lack of demand by small farmers for the modern inputs.
the
and
The structures of resource markets have a crucial role in restraining
outcome of the small farmer maximization problem. Government policy
public institutions have played crucial roles in resource markets.
Between 1963 and 1969, the aim of government policy was to collectivize all
of the resources of private cereals farmers and to place them in large-
scale production cooperatives. It was observed that the outcomes of small
farmer maximization decisions have been influenced by the differential
impact of this collectivization program on the small and large farmer
classes.
The collectivization policy in the locality of Ebbs-Ksour did not
affect most of the large farmers directly until 1968. The mechanizable
land owned by small farmers, on the
and at this time small farmers sold
fear of expropriation and later due
once the cooperativeswere created.
other hand, was collectivized in 1963,
their draft animals, at first from
to restrictions on grazing imposed
With the restoration of private-24a-
Table 6




1. Custom Tractor services:
1/ 2 disc cultivations-
@ 1.500 each
Unimproved
2. Seed @ 5.000/ql~’
3. Harvest!/
TOTAL




1. 5/ Variable tractor costs-
a. Labor (C?.100/hr. x 6.75 hrs.)
b. Fuel (6?8.51ts/hr x .039 x 6.75 hrs.)
c. Servicing (C!.350/hr x 6.75 bra)





























Gross Return @ 15 qxx5.000 75.000
Net Return 47,736
Net Return to Traditional Technology 27.000
Net Return to Modern Technology 47.736
Technology Dividend 20.736
1/ The 1.500 disc cultivation price was observed on the ‘competitive’
pla~n of Zouarines.
~/ One dinar (1.000) is about two U.S. dollars.
~/ 5.000 was the average price paid for durum wheat by the marketing
board after quality adjustments and is also the approximate free market price.
~/ The 5.000 custom harvesting price was observed to be about the same
throughout the locality.
~/ The difference between tractor use time in the partial budget and the
peak period tractor requirements of Table 7 is due to tractor use outside
of the peak period.-25-
agriculture in 1969, small farmers had their land returned, but they no
longer owned a source of traction to start-up plowing for cereals production.
One representative small farmer is quoted in a study done elsewhere in 1969:
“When the cooperativeswere being created, I sold a draft animal for fifteen
dinars. Now the same animal costs between 60 and 110 dinars, and it’s
impossible for me to get it back.” ~–Zamiti, 15, p. 50_T. Most large
farmers, whose resources remained in the production cooperatives for only a
short period, had their machinery returned to them in working order. As a
consequence of collectivization, many small farmers became dependent for
the first time upon tractor services purchased, usually, from a large
i farmer. This assumption is presented in equation R.1 of the model.
t
The inputs of the modern technology, including a flow of machinery
1
/ services, and their financing are, of course, fully divisible; ceteris
paribus, they may be used with equal efficiency on small and large farming
units. But, a comparison of data showing the inputs used for durum wheat
production by small farmers using tractors and draft animals for tillage
collected within and outside of the formerly collectivized zones indicates
that the use of tractor services on small farms has simply substituted
mechanical for animal traction; it has not been accompanied by adoption of
the yield-increasing, biological-chemical inputs (selected seed and chemical
fertilizer) of the modern technology.
Small farmers have not directly adopted the modern technology due
to their exclusion from the bureaucratic and participatory, public institutions
servicing the cereals sector. Large farmers have greater access to the
research, extension, marketing, and credit services of such bureaucratic-26-
institutions as the Accelerated Cereals Production Project, the Office of
Cereals, and the tractor station as the result of minimum-size criteria
for their services and of favoritism by local officials. Through elective
office large farmers enjoy greater power in such participatory institutions
as the local mutual credit union.
Another restraint on small farmer access to the services of public
institutions is the requirement that all applications for their services
18/
must be approved by the local officials of the Ministry of Interior.—
The Ministry of Interior is the most important organization determining
the distribution of purchased resources for cereals production. In the
rural localities, the technical ministries operate only with the approval
I
1
t of its officials. The shaykh (or omdah), the lowest official of the Ministry
of Interior, is responsible for a territorial sub-unit of a delegation.
I
)
The shaykh’s approval is needed for applications made by farmers to be sent
to the appropriate branch of a technical ministry.
The shaykhs were recruited from among the local population. All of the
shaykhs in the locality studied were large farmers who rented a high per-
centage of the land they operated from small farmers. Small farmers complained
frequently of refusals by the shaykhs to accept their applications for
instutional services.
After the reversal of the
recognized the need of helping
production. Two policies were
collectivizationprogram, the government
the private cereals producers to start-up
decided which appear to have been intended
18/ — Thus, the pattern of political control in this locality is not dis-
similar to that found in Morocco. For a discussion of the predomi~ant_
role of the Ministry of Interior in rural Morocco, see Waterbury ~ 17_/,
pp. 280-286. There are also strong continuities between the excercise
of political control in Tunisia by the Protec’to~ate and by t~e
nationalist government, as Ashford documents, ~ 2,pp. 60-93_/. For a
more complete discussion of agricultural resource allocation within
the context of the Tunisian political system, see the thesis by
Fraenkel (forthcoming).-27-
to permit the small farmer, who had sold his draft animals and lacked the
capacity to self-finance cereals production, to begin operation once again.
The first was to make loans available to small farmers from the mutual
credit union system. The second was to liberalize machinery credit policy.
But, as we shall see, these policies did not permit the small farmer to adopt
the modern technology, and probably had little effect in maintaining the
small farmer as an operator.
There are a number of reasons why the mutual credit union at Ebbs-Ksour
did not function as intended. An examination of the amounts of loans made
by the credit union after 1969 to small farmers showed that these were in
fact consumption subsidies and not production credits; it would not have
been possible to start-up cereals production even using the traditional
19/ technology with loans which were as small as 9 dinars.—
A second problem is the relative power of large and small farmers in
the credit union of Ebbs-Ksour.a’ Lending decisions are made by the
union’s board, all of whose eight members are large farmers in the locality.
According to the rules, none of them is even eligible for loans from the union
on whose board they sit. This is not in itself evidence that small farmers
do not get loans from the credit union, but examination of a list of loan
recipients from 1970 to 1973 showed it to be generally true. Significantly,
this examination showed that most of the loans were approved by the board
19/ The tradition of smallholder credit in northern Tunisia since the .
colonial period has been to provide for the subsistence requirements
of the small farm population at times of natural disaster in the guise
of production credit in kind (seed which, of course, may be either consumed
or planted). This tradition was simply perpetuated in 1970 when the
credit union system was used to extend credit to small farmers following
the man-made catastrophe of the production cooperatives.
20/ This has not gone unnoticed by Tunisian and American officials. Johnson, —
for instance, notes the problem of “local p~litical i~fluence on boards
of directors” of the mutual credit unions ~ 8, p. 35_/.only for small
of no interest
-28-
farmers operating non-mechanizable land (and presumably
to the large farmers).
A third problem is the requirement, already discussed, that all loan
applications be first approved by the shaykh before they could be even
considered by the credit union board. Small farmers complained that the
shaykhs would not accept their applications for credit for cereals pro-
duction from the local union.
Following the collectivization program, many small farmers could afford
neither an animal nor mechanical capital resource. There was an increased





for import houses to give suppliers credits for machinery purchase.
this, machinery for cereals production was available only from the
agricultural bank. Bank credit was given only to farmers who
in excess of one hundred hectares, and usually to those who could
use the machinery to capacity on their (owned + rented) land. It may be
assumed that on farms of over 250 hectares (of which one-half are cultivated
annually), a tractor of the capacity generally purchased is utilized fully
(see Table 7). Farmers of this size would have little interest in providing
a flow of custom services to small farmers.
The import houses after 1969 gave credit to cereals.producerson an
ability-to-pay basis. As Table 8 indicates,
50 hectares of dryland for cerealsproduction
could afford a tractor such as the type sold
STEYR 870. On the basis of the calculations
a farmer operating as few as
with the modern technology
most widely since 1970, the
presented in Table 7, we may
assume that the tractor owners eligible for suppliers credits, cultivating
as few as 25 hectares per year, have excess capacity allowing them to
provide custom services.-29-
Table 7:
Tractor Requirements for Cultivated Land Areas of Different Sizes
During Peak Use Period of August to Mid-November
-------------------Number of Hectares ----------------
50 100 125 150 175 200 225 250
Hours per season
4 3/4 hr/hectiare 237 475 594 713 831 950 1,069 1,188
Hours per week
15 wkjseason 15.8 31.7 39.6 47.5 55.2 63.3 71.3 79.2
Table 8:
Financing of a STEYR 870 Tractor on
an Ability-to-Pay Basis
Basic Tractor Cost 3800.000
Implements 1000.000




Min number of hectares cultivated 25.168
Min number of hectares operated (2 x 25.168)4 50.336
1 Based on a repayment period of five years and an interest rate of
7 1/2%, the terms given by the import house.
2 See page 31.
3 This is derived by adding the subsistence expenditure of an average
rural family to the annual tractor payments and dividing the sum by
the net return per hectare to using the modern technology for durum
production.
4 Assuming a biennial, durum - fallow rotation.-30-
But, despite the increase since 1969 in the number of tractors in the
locality due to the suppliers credits, the availability of a flow of custom
services to small farmers varies according to the plain. Each of the three
plains around Ebbs-Ksour constitutes a separate market for tractor services.
There are different degrees of competition among tractor owners on the plains
of Zouarines, Abida, and Lorbeus, of which the competitive, oligopolistic,
and collusive oligopolistic market structures of the model are the empirical
counterparts.
On the ‘competitive’plain of Zouarines, there are 40 owners of tractors
with the capacity of the STEYR 870 who operate an average of 66 hectares of
owned and rented land in cereals production. This is 59 hectares less than
our estimate of full utilization of a tractor of this size, and many of them
perform custom services. On this plain, at the prevailing prices for custom
services, a farmer would have to cultivate 188 hectares of cereal land
21/
using the modern technology to justify purchase of a tractor.— Since
this exceeds by 63 the number of hectares which we assume can be cultivated
by a tractor given the peak season requirements of the modern technology,
we may conclude that prices on this plain are even below the long-run,
competitive equilibrium.
On the ‘oligoplistic,’ plain of Abida, there are only six tractor
owners who provide custom services. They have colluded to fix prices at
approximately 35% above those on the competitive plain. Finally, in
21/ 188 hectares is derived by dividing the payments for the suppliers .
credit for a STEYR 870 tractor (1036.800/year)by the difference
between the cost of custom tractor sercices on the competitive plain




Rural Per Capita Expenditure Pattern, 1965-1968






Amusement and Other 5,500
Total Consumption Expenditures 47.700
Source: Republique Tunisienne, Institut National de la Statistique,
La Consummation et les Depenses des Menages en Tunisie 1965-
1968. Tunis, 1968.-32-
Lorbeus, the collusive oligopolistic plain, the eight owners of tractors
have agreed to provide no custom services, using them only on land which
they operate (own and rent) themselves.
We have further hypothesized that the rental decisions may also be
determined by the magnitude of the ingestible surplus of the small farmer.
In the model, we distinguish among three incor.eclasses of small farmers.
We now estimate the boundary (in number of hectares operated) between the
Class I and Class II small farmers.
In a study of Tunisian consumption patterns conducted between 1965
and 1968, the following rural per capita consumption pattern was reported
(see Table 5). Since the 47.700 dinar figure represents average consumption,
a downward adjustment must be made to obtain a subsistence income. This is
taken to be + of the average figure, or 23.850. The average family size of
the small farmer sample was seven, and consequently Ma* is 166.950 per
year. Based on a net return to the traditional technology of 27.000 it
is possible to estimate the boundary of Class I and Class 11 to be 12.5
hectares,of which one half is planted annually (27.000 x 6.25 *166.950).
w . Hypotheses
To the extent that the actual conditions of the different markets
within the locality and on the three plains correspond to the assumptions
specified in the model, the observations of the small farmer maximization
decision should be consistent with the following hypotheses:
H~ o No rental will occur except at terms mutually
beneficial to both small and large farmers. In other words, at the
very least, neither party’will be made worse off by the arrangement.-33-
R will fall between the net return to the traditional technology
(TX1l) and the net return to the modern technology (~X12), the
gross return minus variable costs.
The net return to the traditional technology is 27.000, or 36% of
the total return of the modern technology; the net return to the modern
technology is 47.736, or 64% of the gross return (see Table 6).
In fact, all observations of rental terms fell between 25% and 50%.
Of 31 observations of rental in the locality, the average rental term
was 35.4%. This is slightly less than the net return to the traditional
technology, or 27.000. Aside from errors in estimating the partial budgets,
there are several reasons why we might expect the rental term to be
discounted.
1) the asymmetry of risks of rental arrangements; since the large
farmer assumes all of the risk of losses from using the modern technology
under dry land conditions, the small land owner may be willing to accept
discounted rental terms;
2) collusion in the land rental market; it was observed that rental
terms on the plain where there was a collusive oligopoly in the custom
services market tended to be the lowest (generally, 30%) of the three plains.
It is possible that the same farmers who have agreed not to provide custom
services here hhve also colluded to maintain rental terms at a level below
those of the other plains.
3) an interest payment for consumption advances; most small farmers
take advances on their share of the harvest to meet the immediate consumption
requirements of their households. The discounted rental terms reflect an
interest payment for these time advances.-34-
Hypothesis II: No small farmer of any class will be operating on
the plain where there is a collusive oligopoly in the custom services
market.
If custom services, following the impact of collectivization, are
indispensable to operation by small farmers, and if none are available, all
small farmers will be forced to rent. As Tables 3 and 5 demonstrate, all
mechanizable land on the ‘collusiveoligopolistic’ plain is now operated
by large farmers. The transfer of land through the rental market from
small to large farmers is completed here. TIIisis consistent with the
hypothesis.
Hypothesis III. No Class I farmer will be operating on any plain.
The upper bound of the Class I small farmer, which represents the minimum
size of a viable dryland cereals farm, was estimated to be 12.5 hectares.
For 68 observations on the three plains of the locality, the average size
of rented plots was 10,74 hectares. This is consistent with the hypothesis.
VII. Conclusion
With respect to the questions posed initially, we may conclude as
follows: In the face of market conditions characteristics of a “dualistic”
agricultural sector, small farmers have chosen to rent to large farm
operators who used the modern technology for cereals production. The potential
of profits from using the modern technology explains rental arrangements
between large and small farmers. The restraints of dualistic market
institutionshave not prevented the diffusion of the modern technology.-35-
Rental terms are generally such that neither party is made worse off by the
arrangement. But, the small farmer is less well off that he would be if
there were different institutions and market structures permitting him
to adopt directly the modern technology. This would allow him, rather
than the large farmer, to internalize the dividend gained from diffusion
of the modern technology.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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